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Abstract
This paper analyzes traffic bottleneck congestion when drivers randomly
cause incidents that temporarily block the bottleneck. Drivers have general
scheduling preferences for time spent at home and at work. They indepen-
dently choose morning departure times from home to maximize expected
utility without knowing whether an incident has occurred. The resulting de-
parture time pattern may be compressed or dispersed according to whether
or not the bottleneck is fully utilized throughout the departure period on
days without incidents. For both the user equilibrium (UE) and the social
optimum (SO) the departure pattern changes from compressed to dispersed
when the probability of an incident becomes sufficiently high. The SO can
be decentralized with a time-varying toll, but drivers are likely to be strictly
worse off than in the UE unless they benefit from the toll revenues in some
way. A numerical example is presented for illustration. Finally, the model is
extended to encompass minor incidents in which the bottleneck retains some
capacity during an incident.
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1 Introduction
Traffic congestion imposes a heavy burden in urban areas. The Texas Transporta-
tion Institute conducts an annual survey of traffic congestion in the US. According
to its 2012 report, in 2011 congestion caused an estimated 5.5 billion hours of
travel delay and 2.9 billion gallons of extra fuel consumption with a total cost of
$121 billion (Schrank et al., 2012). The average cost per automobile commuter
in the urban areas studied was $818. Nonrecurring traffic congestion due to acci-
dents, bad weather, special events, and other shocks accounts for a large fraction
of the total delays. According to Schrank et al. (2011, Appendix B, p. B-27)
incident-related delays alone contribute 52 - 58 percent of total delay in US urban
areas.1
Unanticipated travel delays upset peoples’ travel plans, and may cause them
to arrive late with serious consequences for commuting, business, and other types
of trips. Travelers can sometimes adjust to the threat of delays by changing their
transport mode or destination, or even cancelling trips, but a more common re-
sponse is to adjust departure times. Researchers have long been interested in
studying the adjustment process, and they have adopted various modeling ap-
proaches. In an early and insightful study, Gaver (1968) derived the optimal de-
parture time for a driver faced with stochastic travel time who incurs costs from
both travel time and schedule delay. The optimal policy, which Gaver called a
headstart strategy, entails a probabilistic trade-off between arriving early and ar-
riving late. Gaver assumed that travel time has a constant and exogenous variance,
and he did not attempt to derive an endogenous travel time distribution as a dy-
namic equilibrium. His approach was adopted and extended by Knight (1974);
Hall (1983); Noland and Small (1995), and Noland (1997).
All these studies use models with flow congestion. An alternative approach is
to use the Vickrey (1969) bottleneck model in which congestion delay takes the
form of queuing. A series of studies by Arnott et al. (1991, 1999) and Lindsey
(1994, 1999) introduced stochasticity into the bottleneck model by assuming that
capacity and/or demand fluctuate randomly from day to day, but are constant dur-
ing the period of use on a given day. For want of a better term, we will call this
the “daily-shocks” model.2
1The 2012 Report does not repeat this estimate. As Hall (1993) observes, the contribution of
nonrecurrent congestion is difficult to determine because it depends on the magnitude and timing
of recurrent congestion, and vice versa. Drivers may underestimate the prevalence of nonrecurrent
congestion because incident-induced queues can persist long after the incidents are cleared away.
2Arnott et al. (1991, 1999) and Li et al. (2008) analyze user equilibrium in the daily-shocks
model, whereas Lindsey (1994, 1999) focuses on the social optimum. Other recent papers have
also studied random travel times using the bottleneck model. Xin and Levinson (2007) assume
that travel times are exogenous and independently distributed over time, and their model does
not feature incidents per se. Fosgerau (2010) shows how the dynamics of random congestion
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Our paper differs from these earlier bottleneck-model studies in three ways.
First, they adopted the traditional specification of trip-timing preferences used
by Vickrey (1969) in which individuals have a preferred time to arrive at their
destination and incur a schedule delay cost proportional to the amount of time
they arrive earlier or later. Following Bo¨rjesson et al. (2012) we will call this the
“step” model. Here we adopt a more general scheduling utility function approach
that incorporates preferences for time spent at different activities. We apply the
model to commuting trips by specifying preferences for time spent at home and
at work.3
Second, and more fundamentally, we assume that capacity can fluctuate while
trips are being made rather than being determined before travel begins. Third,
we assume that capacity reductions are due to incidents caused by drivers during
their trip. The timing of shocks is therefore endogenous to the model rather than
exogenous as in earlier studies. Since drivers are responsible for most incidents,
this within-day, endogenous specification of capacity fluctuations accounts for a
significant portion of nonrecurring congestion that occurs. It also provides the
basis for assessing tolling and other policies to reduce the costs of congestion by
altering peoples’ travel decisions. For most of the paper we assume that capacity
is reduced to zero by an incident although in a final section we examine a variant
of the model in which loss of capacity is partial.
Two unpublished studies cover part of the same ground as we do. Schrage
(2006) derives the unregulated and socially optimal departure rates for a single
road link when the accident rate is a function of the inflow rate and therefore en-
dogenous. Her model differs from ours in three main respects. First, she uses the
Henderson (1974) flow congestion model in which a driver’s travel time is deter-
mined by the aggregate departure rate when he starts his trip. This model has no
state variable analogous to queue length in the bottleneck model. Second, capac-
ity is reduced only partially in an incident and it subsequently recovers slowly,
and deterministically, rather than all at once. Third, drivers are assumed to know
whether and when an accident has occurred before they depart. Schrage derives
the optimal time-varying and state-dependent toll that decentralizes the social op-
timum, but she does not solve for the timing of departures in either the unregulated
user equilibrium or the social optimum. In independent work, Peer et al. (2010)
induce characteristic loops in the relationship between the mean and the variance of travel time
over different times of day. de Palma and Fosgerau (2011) analyze random queue sorting whereby
travel time is random from the perspective of individual travellers, but capacity and demand are
fixed.
3Jenelius et al. (2011) use a similar scheduling utility function approach to study the effects of
unpredictable travel time shocks on trip-timing decisions. They apply the model to a full day of
activity including morning and evening commutes. Their model differs in featuring shocks that
are exogenous and independent of time of day. There is also no traffic congestion in their model.
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use the bottleneck model to analyze incidents in which, like Schrage (2006), ca-
pacity loss is partial. They treat incident timing as exogenous and assume that
an incident persists until all drivers have completed their trips. They also adopt
the “step” model of trip-timing preferences. Finally, they limit attention to the
unregulated user equilibrium and do not examine the social optimum or tolling.
In our paper we undertake a systematic analysis of both user (i.e., Nash) equi-
librium and socially optimal trip-timing decisions when drivers do not not know
whether an incident has occurred before they decide when to depart. We solve for
the optimal time-varying (but state-independent) toll that decentralizes the social
optimum. One of the questions we address is whether the bottleneck operates at
capacity throughout the travel period on days when no incident occurs, or whether
some capacity goes “unused”. We show that for both the user equilibrium and so-
cial optimum, spare capacity does exist for part, or all, of the travel period if
incidents are sufficiently probable.4 In contrast to the daily-shocks model, depar-
tures can be more spread out in the user equilibrium than in the social optimum.
Another difference is that the socially-optimal departure rate can decrease, rather
than increase, over time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 summarizes the main features of user equilibrium and social optimum for the
deterministic variant of the model with no incidents. Section 4 derives properties
of the user equilibrium with incidents. Section 5 conducts a parallel analysis
of the social optimum. Section 6 presents a numerical example calibrated for
morning commutes, and then considers a variant for evening commutes. Section 7
undertakes a partial analysis of an extension of the model in which the bottleneck
retains some capacity during an incident. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a
summary and ideas for extension.
2 The model
A continuum ofN identical individuals drive alone from a common origin through
a bottleneck to a common destination.5 To be concrete, in most of the paper the
trip is assumed to be a morning commute from home (H) to work (W ). (However,
an evening commute is also examined in the example section.) Departure time
from home is denoted by t. Drivers6 depart at a rate ρ (t) during a set of times T ;
4Holding spare capacity is broadly consistent with policies of reserving shoulder lanes for use
during accidents and other disruptions.
5A notational glossary is provided at the end of the paper.
6Throughout the paper we will refer to “drivers” even though individuals are treated as a con-
tinuum in the model so that there are no discrete or atomic agents. Reference to “drivers”, “users”,
“commuters” and so on is common in the bottleneck model literature, and it facilitates exposition.
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cumulative departures are thus R (t) =
∫
{v∈T |v≤t} ρ (v) dv.
7 Free-flow travel time
before and after reaching the bottleneck is normalized to zero. A driver departing
at t encounters a queuing delay of q (t) at the bottleneck and reaches work at
time a = t + q (t). Drivers have scheduling preferences8 described by the utility
function
(1) u (t, a) =
∫ t
tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
a
γ (v) dv.
The limits of integration, tH and tW , are chosen such that all travel takes place
within the interval [tH , tW ]. Function β (·) > 0 denotes the flow of utility from
being at home, and function γ (·) > 0 denotes utility from being at work. Func-
tions β (·) and γ (·) are assumed to be continuously differentiable with derivatives
β′ < 0 and γ′ > 0 and to intersect at time t∗.9 Utility from time spent driving
is normalized to zero. These assumptions ensure that, for any fixed trip dura-
tion, there is a unique departure time t, t < t∗, that maximizes scheduling utility.
They also assure that u (t, a) is strictly increasing in t, strictly decreasing in a,
and globally strictly concave. Two final assumptions, Lim
v→tH
β (v) = ∞ and Lim
v→tW
γ (v) =∞, will ensure existence of a Nash equilibrium in departure times.10
If no incident is in progress, the bottleneck has a flow capacity of s. Incidents
are caused by a randomly determined driver and block the bottleneck for a de-
terministic period ∆ > 0. The incident occurs when the driver reaches the head
of the queue (if any) and is about to cross the bottleneck.11 At most one driver
causes an incident on a given day. Let ξ ∈ [0, N ] be the random variable that in-
dicates the position of the culpable driver in the departure schedule if an incident
occurs. Variable ξ has a continuously differentiable density f (ξ) and a cumula-
tive function F (ξ), where F (0) = 0 and F (N) < 1. Function f (·) will be called
7All statements about ρ in the paper will be “almost surely”, since ρ can take arbitrary values
on sets of Lebesgue measure zero without affecting aggregate behaviour or welfare. To ease
exposition this detail will be ignored.
8This formulation of scheduling preferences originates from Vickrey (1969, 1973) and has
been used by Tseng and Verhoef (2008), Fosgerau and Engelson (2011), Fosgerau and de Palma
(2012), Jenelius et al. (2011), and Bo¨rjesson et al. (2012).
9The notation differs from that in the step model where β denotes the cost per minute of
arriving before t∗, and γ denotes the cost per minute of arriving after t∗. The assumptions β′ < 0
and γ′ > 0 rule out the step model because the (implicit) β (·) and γ (·) functions in that model are
constants except at t∗ where γ (·) steps up. This is not particularly restrictive since the step-model
preferences can be approximated arbitrarily closely by differentiable functions. Nevertheless, the
assumptions could be generalized as in Fosgerau and Engelson (2011).
10These assumptions are relaxed in the example of Section 6 where β (·) and γ (·) are linear
functions.
11The mechanics of the model are the same if an incident occurs anywhere between home and
the exit point from the bottleneck. All drivers ahead of the culprit are unaffected by the incident.
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“incident risk” and F (N) “incident probability”.12 A baseline assumption is that
incident risk is constant, and this will be assumed in the numerical example of
Section 6. A day with an incident is called a “Bad day”, and a day without an
incident is called a “Good day”. Any costs associated with incidents other than
delay are ignored.13 For the analysis of the social optimum, we require f (·) to be
differentiable.
Drivers independently choose their departure times to maximize expected schedul-
ing utility while taking the departure rate as given and without knowing whether
an incident has occurred. The first driver departs at time t0. If the bottleneck op-
erates at capacity from t0 on, and driver ξ causes an incident, the incident occurs
at time t0 +
R(ξ)
s
and capacity is restored at t0 +
R(ξ)
s
+ ∆. A driver who is delayed
by an incident will be said to incur “queuing delay” even if the driver causes the
incident and there is no queue of drivers ahead. The duration of an incident, ∆,
is assumed to be long enough that the queue does not dissipate until after the last
driver departs. For future reference this is called the “persistent-queue” assump-
tion. If a queue develops on Good days, it may or may not dissipate before the
last driver departs.
3 User equilibrium and system optimumwithout in-
cidents
As a first step in analyzing the model, and also for later reference, we briefly
describe the user equilibrium and social optimum for a setting in which incidents
do not occur.
3.1 User equilibrium
Fosgerau and de Palma (2012) analyze user equilibrium (UE) in the model without
incidents and their treatment is briefly summarized here. Let superscript e denote
UE and 0 the setting without incidents. It is easy to show that departures take
place during an interval T e0 = [te00 , t
e0
N ]. A queue exists throughout the interior
of T e0, but disappears at time te0N so that t
e0
N = t
e0
0 +
N
s
. de Palma and Fosgerau
12Incident risk depends on ξ, but not on the identity of the individual driver. The order in which
drivers depart therefore does not affect aggregate variables of interest. Incident risk also does
not depend on the rate at which drivers arrive at the bottleneck or on whether there is a queue.
(However, the probability that an incident occurs within a short interval of time is proportional to
the arrival rate at the bottleneck.) Relaxing these assumptions would complicate the analysis.
13Results of interest are unaffected if incidents create additional costs (e.g., related to emergency
response, vehicle repair, filing of insurance claims, etc.) as long as the costs are independent of t
and ξ.
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(2011) refer to elimination of the queue at te0N as the “no residual queue” property
of UE.
Since a queue exists in the interior of T e0, a driver departing at time t exits the
bottleneck at te00 +
Re0(t)
s
. Scheduling utility is constant on T e0 and equal to
u
(
t, te00 +
Re0 (t)
s
)
=
∫ t
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=te00 +
Re0(t)
s
γ (v) dv.
The UE departure rate is derived by differentiating u (·) with respect to t, setting
the derivative to zero, and rearranging terms:
(2)
ρe0 (t)
s
=
β (t)
γ
(
te00 +
Re0(t)
s
) .
Since the first and last drivers receive the same expected utility, u (te00 , t
e0
0 ) =
u
(
te00 +
N
s
, te00 +
N
s
)
. This condition can be written as
(3)
∫ te00 +Ns
v=te00
(β (v)− γ (v)) dv = 0.
Eqn. (3) gives an implicit formula for te00 . It states that a driver who shifts from
departing first to departing last gains additional utility at home that just offsets
foregone utility at work.
A representative user equilibrium is shown in Figure 1. The first driver de-
parting at te00 has a scheduling utility equal to the area under curve abgjdef. This
area is smaller by area bgd than the ideal of leaving home at t∗, arriving immedi-
ately at work, and gaining utility of abcdef . The last driver departing at te0N has a
utility equal to the area under the curve abcdkef which is less than the ideal by
area dke. Condition (3) assures that areas dke and bgd are equal. Now consider
a driver departing at time t, and call this ‘driver t’. From time te00 to t, driver t
gains area bghc more utility than the first driver. From time t to te00 +
Re0(t)
s
, driver
t is caught in the queue and gains less utility than the first driver by area hlmj.
In equilibrium, queuing time is such that area hlmj matches area bghc. This is
equivalent to the condition that driver t’s utility from time spent at home from te00
to t equals the first driver’s utility from time spent at work from t to te00 +
Re0(t)
s
.
Note that driver t’s queuing time is shorter the higher his utility from work
because the driver foregoes more utility while traveling rather than being at work.
Thus, if utility functions β (·) and γ (·) were shifted upwards an equal amount,
area bghc would not change, but area hlmj would become taller and narrower.
This observation helps to explain a difference between the morning commute and
7
Figure 1: Scheduling utility and timing of departures
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evening commute examples in Section 6.
3.2 The social optimum
The social optimum (SO), denoted by superscript w, is derived by choosing ρ (t)
to maximize aggregate scheduling utility:
U =
∫
t∈Tw0
ρ (t)u (t, a) dt,
where Tw0 is the set of SO departure times. The departure rate is maintained at
capacity throughout Tw0 so that no queue is allowed to form, a = t for each driver,
and tw0N = t
w0
0 +
N
s
. Aggregate scheduling utility is therefore
U =
∫ tw00 +Ns
t=tw00
su (t, t) dt = s
∫ tw00 +Ns
t=tw00
[∫ t
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=t
γ (v) dv
]
dt.
The first-order condition for tw00 is
(4)
∫ tw00 +Ns
v=tw00
(β (v)− γ (v)) dv = 0.
Equation (4) for tw00 is identical to eqn. (3) for t
e0
0 . Departures therefore occur
over the same time interval in UE and SO: Tw0 = T e0.
It is straightforward to show that the SO can be decentralized by levying a
time-varying toll, τw0 (t), such that u (t, t) − τw0 (t) is constant for t ∈ Tw0 and
lower for t /∈ Tw0. If demand were elastic, the toll must be zero at the beginning
and end of the travel period (Arnott et al., 1993). Here the number of drivers
is fixed, and a constant can be added to the toll schedule without affecting trip
timing. Nevertheless, it is natural to set the toll to zero at the beginning and end
of the departure period so that τw0 (tw00 ) = τ
w0 (tw0N ) = 0.
4 User equilibrium with incidents
Consider now the case of interest in which incidents can occur. We begin by estab-
lishing some general characteristics of UE. This is followed by separate analyses
of the compressed departures and dispersed departures configurations.
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4.1 General characteristics of user equilibrium
Lemmas 1 and 2 below summarize properties of a UE.
Lemma 1 (a): The UE departure rate, ρe (t), is strictly positive on an interval
T e = (te0, t
e
N). (b): t
∗ ∈ (te0, teN). (c): Re (teN) = N ≤ s (teN − te0): on Good days
the no-residual queue property holds.
Proof. Part (a): ρe (t) cannot drop to zero in the interior of T e since otherwise
some driver could increase expected utility by departing during the gap. Part
(b): Clearly te0 < t
∗; otherwise any driver departing after t∗ could increase util-
ity by departing at t∗ instead. Suppose teN ≤ t∗ so that β (teN) ≥ γ (teN). If
the last driver departed dt later, his expected utility would change by dE (u|teN) =
(β (teN)− (1− F (N)) γ (teN)) dt. Given β (teN) ≥ γ (teN) andF (N) > 0, dE (u|teN) >
0 and teN cannot be an individually optimal departure time. Part (c): If R
e (teN) >
s (teN − te0), there would be a queue at teN . This would violate the no residual
queue property, and the last driver could leave home later without arriving at work
later.
Lemma 2 In UE the last departure time, teN , is such that
(5) F (N) ≤ 1− β (t
e
N)
γ (teN)
.
Proof. By Lemma 1, on Good days there is no residual queue at teN . And by the
persistent-queue assumption, if an incident occurs the queue persists until after
teN . A driver departing just after t
e
N therefore encounters a queue with probability
F (N), and the driver’s expected utility changes at a rate
(6)
∂E (u|t)
∂t
= β (t)− (1− F (N)) γ (t) .
Expression (6) must be non-positive for t ≥ teN ; otherwise the last driver could
increase utility by departing later. Since (6) is largest for t = teN , inequality (5)
must hold.14
Expression (6) is readily interpreted. β (t) is the marginal benefit at time t
from staying longer at home, and γ (t) is the marginal cost of delaying arrival at
work. Departing later implies arriving later if no incident has occurred which is
the case with probability 1−F (N). If an incident has occurred, there is no cost of
delaying departure since the driver merely spends less time queuing and reaches
14There is no additional equilibrium condition analogous to (5) that applies to te0 because an
incident cannot occur before te0. Given t
e
0 < t
∗, departing before te0 would clearly not be optimal.
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work at the same time. If F (N) is sufficiently large, and ∆ is sufficiently small,
the persistent queue assumption will be violated since any teN that satisfies (5)
will occur after the queue dissipates. The persistent queue assumption therefore
imposes bounds on F (N) and ∆.
User equilibrium follows one of two patterns. In one, queuing on Good days
persists until the last driver has departed. Similar to UE with no incidents, all
drivers complete their trips within the minimum feasible time interval of N/s.
This pattern will be called “compressed” departures. In the second pattern, called
“dispersed” departures, queuing ends on Good days before the last driver departs
and departures extend for a time interval longer than N/s. The compressed-
departures and dispersed-departures patterns are examined separately in the next
two subsections.
4.2 User equilibrium with compressed departures
The main characteristics of a compressed-departures UE are summarized in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 Assume departures are compressed. Then a unique Nash equilibrium
exists. The equilibrium departure rate is
ρe (t)
s
=
β (t) (1− F (Re (t))) γ
(
te0 +
Re(t)
s
)
+ F (Re (t)) γ
(
te0 +
Re(t)
s
+ ∆
)
+f (Re (t))
∫ te0+Re(t)s +∆
v=te0+
Re(t)
s
γ (v) dv

.(7)
The departure time set T e is determined by the conditions teN = t
e
0 +N/s and
(8)
∫ teN
v=te0
(β (v)− γ (v)) dv = F (N)
∫ teN+∆
v=teN
γ (v) dv.
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Proof. Expected utility from departing at t is
E (u|t) = (1− F (Re (t)))u
(
t, te0 +
Re (t)
s
)
+F (Re (t))u
(
t, te0 +
Re (t)
s
+ ∆
)
=
∫ t
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=te0+
Re(t)
s
γ (v) dv
−F (Re (t))
∫ v=te0+Re(t)s +∆
v=te0+
Re(t)
s
γ (v) dv,(9)
which is constant during T e.15 Differentiate and set to zero to obtain
β (t)− γ
(
te0 +
Re (t)
s
)
ρe (t)
s
− f (Re (t)) ρe (t)
∫ te0+Re(t)s +∆
v=te0+
Re(t)
s
γ (v) dv
−F (Re (t)) ρ
e (t)
s
(
γ
(
te0 +
Re (t)
s
+ ∆
)
− γ
(
te0 +
Re (t)
s
))
= 0.
Collecting terms in ρe (t) yields (7) which simplifies to (2) if f (n) = 0, ∀n.
Utility from departing at te0 is given by (9) with t = t
e
0:
(10) E (u|te0) = u (te0, te0) =
∫ te0
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=te0
γ (v) dv.
Expected utility from departing at teN is given by (9) with t = t
e
N :
(11) E (u|teN) =
∫ teN
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=teN
γ (v) dv − F (N)
∫ teN+∆
v=teN
γ (v) dv.
Equating (10) and (11) yields condition (8). The left-hand side of (8) is decreasing
in te0, while (given t
e
N = t
e
0 +N/s) the right-hand side is increasing. Any solution
is thus unique. Existence is guaranteed by the assumptions Lim
v→tH
β (v) = ∞ and
Lim
v→tW
γ (v) =∞.
15The first expression for expected utility in (9) is explained as follows. The first term pertains
to utility when there is no incident which occurs with probability 1−F (Re (t)). The driver departs
at time t and arrives at te0 +
Re(t)
s when the R
e (t) preceding drivers have passed the bottleneck.
The second term pertains to utility when an incident has occurred, with probability F (Re (t)).
Since the bottleneck is shut for a period ∆, the driver arrives at te0 +
Re(t)
s + ∆.
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The candidate compressed UE described in Theorem 1 can be tested by solv-
ing for teN using (8), and substituting the result into Condition (5). If (5) is satis-
fied, the UE is indeed compressed. If (5) is violated, the UE is dispersed. Condi-
tion (5) is assumed to be satisfied in the balance of this subsection.
The right-hand side of (8) is an increasing function of F (N) and ∆. Thus, the
greater the incident probability and the longer an incident lasts, the earlier depar-
tures begin. This result is consistent with the Gaver (1968) analysis of headstart
strategies, mentioned in the introduction.
Corollary 1 Assume departures are compressed, and f (n) is independent of n.
Then ρe is decreasing so that Re is concave.
Proof. Concavity of Re follows from equation (7) since β (t) in the numerator is
a decreasing function of t, whereas in the denominator: γ
(
te0 +
Re(t)
s
)
,
γ
(
te0 +
Re(t)
s
+ ∆
)
,
∫ te0+Re(t)s +∆
v=te0+
Re(t)
s
γ (v) dv andF (Re (t)) are all increasing; γ
(
te0 +
Re(t)
s
+ ∆
)
>
γ
(
te0 +
Re(t)
s
)
; and f (Re (t)) is constant.
Concavity of the cumulative departure schedule implies that the departure rate
decreases monotonically over time, and also that on good days queuing can oc-
cur only during one connected time period. Concavity is also a property of user
equilibrium in the daily-shocks model (Arnott et al., 1999, Proposition 1).
From equation (7) the initial departure rate is
(12)
ρe (te0)
s
=
β (te0)
γ (te0) + f (0)
∫ te0+∆
v=te0
γ (v) dv
.
With no incidents, the initial departure rate is given by eqn. (2):
(13)
ρe0 (te00 )
s
=
β (te00 )
γ (te00 )
.
Compared to (13), eqn. (12) includes an additional term in the denominator, but
since te0 < t
e0
0 , β (t
e
0) > β (t
e0
0 ) and γ (t
e
0) < γ (t
e0
0 ). It is therefore unclear
whether incident risk induces drivers to depart at a faster or slower initial rate.
(In the example presented in Section 6 the departure rate is faster.) However, if
there is no incident risk for the first drivers (i.e., f (0) = 0), then it follows from
(13), (12), and te0 < t
e0
0 that the initial departure rate is higher when incidents can
occur. This is also a property of the model with exogenous incidents in Peer et al.
(2012).
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4.3 User equilibrium with dispersed departures
If a candidate UE with compressed departures is computed using equation (8), and
inequality (5) is violated, the UE is dispersed. Depending on the time path of f (·),
the departure rate can be nonmonotonic, and on Good days queuing can occur in
disjoint time intervals. This is conceivable if f (·) has a pronounced double peak,
but it seems unlikely since the natural baseline is for incident risk to be constant.
To keep the analysis tractable it is assumed that any queuing on Good days occurs
during a single interval beginning at te0. Thus, suppose that on Good days there is
a queue for t ∈ (te0, t˜) and no queue for t ∈ [t˜, teN]. For t ∈ (te0, t˜), the departure
rate is given by (7). For t ∈ [t˜, teN], equation (9) does not apply and expected
utility must be computed afresh. If an incident occurs at time v ≤ t˜, a driver
departing at t arrives at time a = te0 +
Re(t)
s
+ ∆. If v ≥ t˜, arrival time is defined
by the condition Re (v) + s (a− v −∆) = Re (t), or a = v + ∆ + Re(t)−Re(v)
s
.16
Expected utility is therefore17
E (u|t) = (1− F (Re (t)))u (t, t)
+F
(
Re
(
t˜
))
u
(
t, te0 +
Re (t)
s
+ ∆
)
+
∫ t
v=t˜
ρ (v) f (Re (v))u
(
t, v + ∆ +
Re (t)−Re (v)
s
)
dv.(14)
Differentiating (14) with respect to t, and setting the derivative to zero, one
16This equation is explained as follows. When an incident occurs at time v, Re (v) drivers have
passed the bottleneck. During the interval [v, v + ∆], no further drivers can pass. After v + ∆,
drivers pass the bottleneck again at rate s as long as a queue persists. Cumulative passages through
the bottleneck by time a > v + ∆ are therefore Re (v) + s (a− v −∆). A driver who departs at
time t is preceded by Re (t) other drivers. This driver therefore arrives when the bottleneck has
processed this number of drivers: Re (v) + s (a− v −∆) = Re (t).
17The first term in (14) covers instances in which no incident occurs. The probability of no
incident is 1 − F (Re (t)). The driver encounters no queue, and therefore arrives immediately at
t and receives a utility of u (t, t). The second term covers instances in which an incident occurs
before t˜ which happens with probability F
(
Re
(
t˜
))
. The number of drivers who have departed by
t isRe (t). Were there no incident, the driver departing at twould pass the bottleneck at te0+
Re(t)
s .
With an incident, arrival is delayed by ∆ and the driver passes the bottleneck at te0 +
Re(t)
s + ∆.
The last term covers instances in which an incident occurs after t˜ but before the driver departs at t.
If an incident occurs at time v, the driver arrives at v + ∆ + R
e(t)−Re(v)
s as explained above eqn.
(14). Since there is no queue before v, the driver responsible for an incident at time v leaves home
at time v. The probability that this driver causes an accident is f (Re (v)), and the rate at which
drivers are departing at time v is ρ (v). This explains the integrand of the last term.
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obtains
β (t)− (1− F (Re (t))) γ (t)− f (Re (t)) ρe (t)
∫ t+∆
v=t
γ (v) dv
−ρ
e (t)
s
F
(
Re
(
t˜
))
γ
(
te0 +
Re (t)
s
+ ∆
)
−ρ
e (t)
s
∫ t
v=t˜
ρ (v) f (Re (v)) γ
(
v + ∆ +
Re (t)−Re (v)
s
)
dv = 0.
Collecting terms in ρe (t) yields
(15)
ρe (t)
s
=
β (t)− (1− F (Re (t))) γ (t) sf (Re (t)) ∫ t+∆v=t γ (v) dv + F (Re (t˜)) γ (te0 + Re(t)s + ∆)
+
∫ t
v=t˜
ρ (v) f (Re (v)) γ
(
v + ∆ + R
e(t)−Re(v)
s
)
dv
 .
The denominator of (15) is strictly positive. The numerator must be positive until
t = teN , and nonpositive thereafter. Thus, the departure rate drops to zero at t
e
N
which is defined by the condition
(16) β (teN) = (1− F (N)) γ (teN) .
Condition (5) therefore holds as an equality when departures are dispersed.
The UE with dispersed departures can be solved numerically using the following
iterative procedure:
1. Guess te0.
2. Integrate eqn. (7) from t = te0 to t = t˜, where t˜ is defined by the condition
R
(
t˜
)
= s
(
t˜− te0
)
.
3. Integrate eqn. (15) from t = t˜ to t = teN where t
e
N is defined by condition
(16).
4. If Re (teN) matches N within a tolerance limit, then stop. Otherwise return
to step 1.
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5 The social optimum with incidents
5.1 Preliminary results
The SO with incidents maximizes total expected utility:
(17) E (U) =
∫
t∈Tw
ρ (t)E (u|t) dt,
where Tw is the set of SO departure times. The SO departure rate, ρw (t), maxi-
mizes E (U) subject to the feasibility constraints ρw (t) ≥ 0 and Rw (twN) = N .
Before tackling this optimal control problem some general properties of ρw (t)
will be deduced.
Lemma 3 (a): The SO departure rate never exceeds capacity: ρw (t) ≤ s. (b):
t∗ ∈ int (Tw).
Lemma 3 is proved in Appendix B.1. Part (a) is obvious: exceeding capacity
would cause queuing on Good days without giving any driver extra time at home
or work. Part (b) is also intuitive: to maximize total scheduling utility at home
and work, the first driver must depart when home time is more valuable, and the
last driver must depart when work time has greater value.
Lemma 4 In the SO, the last departure time, twN , is such that
(18) F (N) ≤ 1− β (t
w
N)
γ (twN)
.
Proof. If the last driver is rescheduled to depart slightly after twN , other drivers are
unaffected and the change in total expected utility is limited to the last driver. The
proof of Lemma 2 therefore applies to Lemma 4.
Condition (18) on twN has the same functional form as condition (5) on t
e
N .
This congruence will be used later to compare the timing of departures in the SO
and UE.
Lemmas 3 and 4 establish some bounds on the rate and timing of departures in
the SO, but a number of questions remain. Should ρw (t) ever be reduced below
capacity? If so, how does ρw (t) vary over time thereafter? Is ρw (t) a continuous
function? Is it ever optimal to reduce ρw (t) low enough and long enough to elimi-
nate queuing for at least some incident states? Various behaviors are possible. For
example, suppose an early incident is likely, the incident risk then declines, and
∆ is large. The model is then similar to the daily-shocks model for which ρw (t)
is weakly increasing over time (Lindsey, 1994). If, alternatively, an early incident
is likely, but ∆ is small, it is optimal to hold ρw (t) below capacity long enough to
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clear any queue from the probable, but short-lived incident. A third possibility is
that incident risk is increasing with n. In this case it may be prudent to accelerate
departures in order to induce incidents earlier, and allow them to be cleared away
sooner so that most drivers do not arrive inordinately late.
Given the wide range of possible solutions, the SO is difficult to analyze in
full generality. Technical obstacles also arise. These can be circumvented by
reformulating the optimization problem (see below), but the solution is tedious.
Consequently, attention will be focused on the optimal timing of departures and
on whether the departure rate should ever be reduced below capacity.
5.2 Optimal control formulation
Three technical difficulties arise if optimal control theory18 is applied to maximize
(17) with respect to ρw (t). First, the Hamiltonian depends on lagged values of
ρw. This problem is partly overcome by using the index or position of drivers
in the departure schedule, n, as the running variable rather than t. The control
variable becomes the time headway between successive drivers rather than the
departure rate. Second, the Hamiltonian depends on lagged values of the state
variable R. This problem is circumvented by replacing R with a set of state-
contingent queuing times.19 Third, the equation of motion for queuing time q (t) is
not differentiable at q = 0. This problem is addressed by imposing a nonnegativity
constraint on queuing time that binds during time intervals when ρw (t) = s.
The optimal solution of the reformulated problem is assumed to comprise two
stages. In Stage 1, which includes drivers n ∈ [0, nˆ], headway – denoted by h – is
maintained at h (n) = 1/s. This is equivalent to holding the departure rate at ca-
pacity. In Stage 2, which encompasses the remaining drivers n ∈ (nˆ, N ], headway
is increased above 1/s. The optimal value of nˆ is solved as described below. If
nˆ = N , Stage 2 is degenerate and the departure rate is held at capacity throughout
the travel period. On Good days, all drivers travel within a time span of N/s, and
the departure schedule is compressed in the same sense as it is compressed in the
UE. If nˆ = 0, Stage 1 is degenerate and the departure rate is held below capacity
throughout.
Total expected utility for the two stages combined is:
(19) E (U) =
∫ N
n=0
[
(1− F (n))U (t (n) , t (n) + q+ (n))
+
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ)U (t (n) , t (n) + qξ (n)) dξ
]
dn,
where t (n) is departure time for driver n, q+ (n) is queuing time experienced by
18Optimal control methods are described in Kamien and Schwartz (1981, Part II) and Leonard
and Van Long (1992, Chap. 6).
19Lindsey (1994) also uses this approach.
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driver n if no incident has occurred, and qξ (n) is queuing time experienced by
driver n if driver ξ ≤ n has caused an incident. The equations of motion for
q+ (n) and qξ (n) are:
dq+ (n)
dn
=
{
1
s
− h (n) if q+ (n) > 0, or q+ (n) = 0 and h (n) < 1s
0 otherwise
}
,
dqξ (n)
dn
=
{
1
s
− h (n) if qξ (n) > 0, or qξ (n) = 0 and h (n) < 1s
0 otherwise
}
, ξ < n.
In Stage 1, the constraint q+ (n) ≥ 0 is binding. Given the persistent-queue as-
sumption, the nonnegativity constraint qξ (n) ≥ 0 can be ignored in both stages.
5.2.1 Stage 1: Departure rate held at capacity
The equations of motion and constraints for Stage 1 are:
(20)
dt (n)
dn
= h (n) (costate variable µ1 (n) ≤ 0),
(21) q+ (n) ≥ 0 (multiplier Ψ (n) ≥ 0),
(22)
dq+ (n)
dn
=
1
s
− h (n) (costate variable λ+ (n) ≤ 0),
(23)
dqξ (n)
dn
=
1
s
− h (n) , ξ < n (costate variable λξ (n) ≤ 0).
Equation (20) stipulates that departure time, a state variable, increases at a rate
equal to the headway between successive drivers. Costate variable µ1 reflects the
benefit of occupying or “using up” departure time slots. Because departure time
slots are valuable in the interior of Tw, µ1 < 0. Initial conditions are:
(24) t (0) free,
(25) µ1 (0) = 0,
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(26) q+ (0) = 0,
(27) qξ (ξ) = ∆, ξ ∈ [0, N ] .
The departure time for the first driver is chosen freely as per Condition (24).
Costate variable µ1 is therefore zero for the first driver as per Condition (25).
Queuing time on Good days is initially zero as per Condition (26). If an incident
occurs, queuing time jumps from 0 to ∆ as per Condition (27).
The Hamiltonian is20
Ω = (1− F (n))U (t (n) , t (n) + q+ (n)) +
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ)U (t (n) , t (n) + qξ (n)) dξ
+µ1 (n)h (n) + (1− F (n)) Ψ (n) q+ (n) + (1− F (n))λ+ (n)
(
1
s
− h (n)
)
+
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ)λξ (n) dξ
(
1
s
− h (n)
)
.(28)
Optimality conditions are21
(29)
∂Ω
∂h
= µ1 (n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
− (1− F (n))λ+ (n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
−
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ)λξ (n) dξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
= 0,
(30)
∂µ1 (n)
∂n
= − ∂H
∂t (n)
= −

β (t (n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
− (1− F (n)) γ (t (n) + q+ (n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
−
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ) γ (t (n) + qξ (n)) dξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)

,
(31)
∂λ+ (n)
∂n
= − ∂H
∂q+ (n)
= γ (t (n) + q+ (n))−Ψ (n) ,
20In (28) the multiplier Ψ (n) and the costate variables λ+ (n) and λξ (n) are multiplied by their
respective probability and probability densities. This facilitates interpretation of the optimality
conditions.
21Second-order conditions for an optimum are assumed to hold.
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(32)
∂λξ (n)
∂n
= − ∂H
∂qξ (n)
= γ (t (n) + qξ (n)) , ξ < n.
Equation (29) identifies the net benefit from marginally increasing the headway
for driver n. Term (1) is the opportunity cost of allocating more departure time to
driver n. Term (2) is the expected benefit from reducing queuing time when no
incident has occurred. Similarly, Term (3) is the expected benefit from reducing
queuing time when an incident has occurred. At the optimum, the opportunity cost
matches the expected benefits. Equation (30) describes the evolution of µ1 (n),
where µ1 (n) < 0 corresponds to the disbenefit of using up departure time slots.
The term in braces is the rate of change in driver n’s expected utility as the driver’s
departure time increases. Term (1) is driver n’s utility from staying longer at
home. Term (2) is driver n’s expected loss of work-time utility if no incident
has occurred, and term (3) is the corresponding loss if an incident has occurred.
Finally, equations (31) and (32) describe the evolution of the costate variables,
λ+ (n) and λξ (n), which specify the shadow benefit of queuing time, and thus
are negative. Equation (31) governs the disbenefit of queuing time when there is
no incident. This disbenefit declines over time as fewer drivers remain who will
arrive late. Equation (32) is interpreted similarly.
5.2.2 Solution with compressed departures
Stage 1 can prevail for none, some, or all of the travel period. If it prevails for all
of it, the SO is compressed. The departure rate is held at capacity, and first-order
condition (29) is not needed to derive the solution. Total expected utility is given
by (19) with q+ (n) = 0, t (n) = tw0 + n/s, and t (n) + qξ (n) = t (ξ) + ∆ +
(n− ξ) /s = tw0 + n/s+ ∆. Using (1), this yields
E (U) =
∫ N
n=0
[ ∫ tw0 +n/s
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=tw0 +n/s
γ (v) dv
−F (n) ∫ tw0 +n/s+∆
v=tw0 +n/s
γ (v) dv
]
dn.
The first-order condition for tw0 is
∂E (U)
∂tw0
=
∫ N
n=0
[
β (tw0 + n/s)− γ (tw0 + n/s)
−F (n) (γ (tw0 + n/s+ ∆)− γ (tw0 + n/s))
]
dn = 0,
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or ∫ N
n=0
(β (tw0 + n/s)− γ (tw0 + n/s)) dn =∫ N
n=0
F (n) (γ (tw0 + n/s+ ∆)− γ (tw0 + n/s)) dn.(33)
Using integration by parts, the right-hand side of (33) can be written
F (n)
∫ tw0 +n/s+∆
t=tw0 +n/s
γ (v) dv
∣∣∣∣∣
N
n=0
−
∫ N
n=0
f (n)
∫ tw0 +n/s+∆
t=tw0 +n/s
γ (v) dtdn
= F (N)
∫ twN+∆
t=twN
γ (t) dt−
∫ N
n=0
f (n)
∫ tw0 +n/s+∆
t=tw0 +n/s
γ (t) dtdn.
Changing the variable of integration from n to t = tw0 + n/s yields, finally,∫ twN
t=tw0
(β (t)− γ (t)) dt =(34)
F (N)
∫ twN+∆
t=twN
γ (t) dt− s
∫ twN
t=tw0
f (s (t− tw0 ))
(∫ t+∆
v=t
γ (v) dv
)
dt.
Holding F (N) fixed, the right-hand side of (34) is a decreasing function of f (·)
on the interval (0, N). Departures in the SO therefore begin later the higher the
incident risk for any given incident probability. The right-hand side of (34) is an
increasing function of ∆ so that, similar to the UE, departures begin earlier the
longer incidents last.
To determine whether the SO is indeed compressed, twN can be solved with
(34) and substituted into Condition (18).22 If the SO and UE are both compressed
it is possible to compare their trip timing and welfare as is done in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 Assume departures are compressed in both UE and SO. Then (a):
Departures begin later in the SO than in the UE, but earlier than in the model
without incidents: te0 < t
w
0 < t
e0
0 = t
w0
0 . (b): The SO can be implemented using a
time-dependent toll. (c): If the toll is constrained to be non-negative, drivers are
strictly worse off than in the UE if they do not benefit from the toll revenues.
22Condition (18) can be derived using the optimal control formulation in this subsection by
substituting µ1 (N) = 0, Ψ (N) q+ (N) = 0, h (N) = 1s , and t (N) + qξ (N) = t
w
0 + N/s + ∆
into the Hamiltonian (28), differentiating it with respect to t (N), and evaluating the derivative at
t (N) = twN .
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Theorem 2 is proved in Appendix B.2. Part (a) of Theorem 2 indicates that
departures begin and end later in the SO than UE if both are compressed.23 To see
why, note that in the UE the first and last drivers gain the same expected utility
or, equivalently, incur the same expected private travel cost. The first driver is
therefore indifferent between continuing to depart first, and switching to depart
last. However, by switching to last the driver no longer imposes an accident risk
on other drivers. Starting from the UE departure schedule this switch is therefore
socially desirable at the margin, and the SO therefore has a later departure sched-
ule than the user equilibrium. Looked at another way, the last driver does not
impose an accident externality because there are no subsequent drivers to delay.
However, the last driver is concerned about being delayed by an incident caused
by one of the earlier drivers. By contrast, the first driver is not concerned about
being delayed, but does impose an externality on all the other drivers. Individuals
are therefore biased towards departing too early. In this respect, the UE is more
sensitive than the SO to incident risks.
Part (b) of Theorem 2 asserts that, as in the model without incidents, the SO
departure schedule can be decentralized with a time-varying toll. Part (c) states
that the toll makes drivers worse off. This is because the toll must be higher at
the beginning of the departure period than at the end so that drivers delay depar-
ture.24 Since negative tolls are ruled out by assumption, the first driver has to pay
a positive toll.
As noted above, Conditions (5) and (18) have the same functional form. Since
twN > t
e
N if the UE and SO are both compressed, Condition (5) is more stringent
than Condition (18). It is therefore possible for Condition (5) to fail for a candidate
compressed UE so that the UE is dispersed, but for Condition (18) to hold so
that the SO is compressed.25 The results of Theorem 2 still apply in this case as
formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Assume departures are dispersed in the UE but compressed in the SO.
Then (a): Departures begin and end later in the SO than in the UE, but earlier
than in the model without incidents: te0 < t
w
0 < t
e0
0 = t
w0
0 . (b): The SO can be
implemented using a time-dependent toll. (c): If the toll is constrained to be non-
negative, drivers are strictly worse off than in the UE if they do not benefit from
the toll revenues.
23This contrasts with the daily-shocks model in which the SO can begin earlier (Lindsey, 1994).
24This is unlike either the model without incidents or the daily-shocks model (see Lindsey
(1994, Proposition 10)).
25This possibility contrasts with a property of (deterministic) flow-congestion models that de-
partures are more spread out in the system optimum than user equilibrium as long as flow is not
hypercongested. See Chu (1995), Small and Verhoef (2007, Section 4.1.2), and DePalma and
Arnott (2012).
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Theorem 3 is proved in Appendix B.3. The intuition underlying Theorem 3 is
the same as for Theorem 2.
5.2.3 Stage 2: Departure rate held below capacity
The equations of motion and constraints for Stage 2 of the SO are similar to Stage
1:
(35)
dt (n)
dn
= h (n) (costate variable µ2 (n) ≤ 0),
(36)
dqξ (n)
dn
=
1
s
− h (n) , ξ < n (costate variable λξ (n) ≤ 0).
In Stage 2 the departure rate is held below capacity so that q+ (n) = 0. This
variable and its associated multiplier, Ψ (n), are thus omitted. Terminal conditions
are:
(37) µ2 (N) = 0,
(38) λξ (N) = 0, ξ ∈ (0, N ] .
Costate variable µ2 for departure time is zero for the last driver, as per Condition
(37), because departure time slots after t (N) are available, but undesirable. The
shadow value of queuing time is also zero for the last driver as per Condition (38)
because there are no further drivers to be delayed by a queue.
The Hamiltonian for Stage 2 is
Ω = (1− F (n))U (t (n) , t (n)) +
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ)U (t (n) , t (n) + qξ (n)) dξ
+µ2 (n)h (n) +
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ)λξ (n) dξ
(
1
s
− h (n)
)
.(39)
Optimality conditions are:
(40)
∂Ω
∂h
= µ2 (n)−
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ)λξ (n) dξ = 0,
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(41)
∂µ2 (n)
∂n
= − ∂H
∂t (n)
= −
{
β (t (n))− (1− F (n)) γ (t (n))
− ∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ) γ (t (n) + qξ (n)) dξ
}
,
(42)
∂λξ (n)
∂n
= − ∂H
∂qξ (n)
= γ (t (n) + qξ (n)) , ξ < n.
Equations (40) and (41) have similar interpretations to (29) and (30) for Stage 1.
Integrating (42), and using terminal condition (38), gives an equation for λξ (n):
(43) λξ (n) = −
∫ N
v=n
γ
(
t (ξ) + ∆ + s−1 (v − ξ)) dv.
Differentiating (40) with respect to n, and matching the resulting expression
for ∂µ2(n)
∂n
with (41), one obtains:
(44) β (t (n)) = (1− F (n)) γ (t (n))− f (n)λn (n) , n ∈ [nˆ, N) .
Equation (44) characterizes the optimal departure time for driver n. Except for
the last term, it has a similar interpretation to equation (6) for the UE. The left-
hand side is the marginal benefit to driver n from delaying departure. The first
term on the right-hand side is the expected marginal cost to driver n of delaying
arrival at work when there is no incident. The second term on the right-hand
side is the expected additional marginal external cost that driver n imposes on
subsequent drivers. This cost arises because any incident will end later and hence
cause subsequent drivers to arrive later and lose more time at work.
Given terminal condition (38), λN (N) = 0 and equation (44) simplifies with
n = N to
(45) β (tw (N)) = (1− F (N)) γ (tw (N)) ,
where superscript w is added to clarify comparison with the UE. Condition (18)
therefore holds as an equality if departures are dispersed in the SO. Equation (45)
for tw (N) is identical to equation (16) for teN with dispersed departures in UE.
Hence twN = t
e
N : if departures are dispersed in both the SO and UE, then depar-
tures end at the same time. This contrasts with the case where both UE and SO
are compressed in which SO departures begin and end later.
If driver ξ causes an incident, driver n > ξ is delayed at the bottleneck until
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time
(46) t (n) + qξ (n) = t (ξ) + ∆ + s−1 (n− ξ) .
Using (46), and differentiating (44) with respect to n, one obtains (see Appendix
B.4) an expression for the SO headway:
(47)
h (n) =
f (n)
(
γ (t (n)) + γ (t (n) + ∆)
+s−1
∫ N
v=n
γ´ (t (n) + ∆ + s−1 (v − n)) dv
)
+ λn (n) ∂f (n) /∂n
(1− F (n)) γ´ (t (n))− β´ (t (n))
+f (n)
∫ N
v=n
γ´ (t (n) + ∆ + s−1 (v − n)) dv
.
The denominator of (47) is strictly positive. If f (n) = ∂f (n) /∂n = 0, the
numerator is zero which is inconsistent with the requirement that h (n) > 1/s
in Stage 2. Thus, Stage 2 can prevail for a given n only if incident risk f (n) is
sufficiently high and/or increasing. Optimal headway is an increasing function
of f (n) because queuing becomes more likely in the future, and increasing the
headway reduces queuing time. In the last term of the numerator, λn (n) < 0
for n < N . Optimal headway is therefore smaller if incident risk is increasing.
This is because accelerating departures induces incidents to occur and end sooner,
thereby allowing later drivers to arrive with shorter delays.
As noted above, if departures are dispersed in the SO, then they are also dis-
persed in the UE. The SO and UE with dispersed departures are difficult to com-
pare because the UE departure rate in (15) is very different in functional form
from the departure rate implied by the SO headway in (47). It is easy to show that
the SO can still be supported by a time-varying toll, but results analogous to those
in parts (a) and (c) of Theorems 2 and 3 have eluded us.
5.2.4 Numerical solution method
The SO with dispersed departures cannot, in general, be solved analytically. To
solve it numerically, eqn. (43) with ξ = n can be substituted into (44) to obtain an
equation for departure time during Stage 2, t2 (n). The remaining unknowns, tw0
and nˆ, are solved using two conditions. First, the departure time for driver nˆ must
be the same in Stage 1 and Stage 2:
(48) t1 (nˆ) = tw0 + nˆ/s = t2 (nˆ) .
Second, the costate variables µ1 and µ2 must match at nˆ:
(49) µ1 (nˆ) = µ2 (nˆ) .
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µ1 (nˆ) is computed by integrating (30) forward with respect to n, starting at
n = 0 with µ1 (0) = 0. µ2 (nˆ) is computed by integrating (41) backward with
respect to n, starting at n = N with µ2 (N) = 0. (If Stage 2 is optimal throughout
the departure period, then nˆ = 0 and eqns. (48) and (49) do not have an interior
solution.) A notable feature of the solution with nˆ > 0 is that h2 (nˆ) > 1/s.
Optimal headway is therefore discontinuous, and takes an upward jump at the
transition point from Stage 1 to Stage 2.
6 A numerical example
An example is now presented to obtain further insights into the characteristics of
the UE and SO, as well as to get a sense of the quantitative importance of inci-
dents. Following Fosgerau and Engelson (2011), the scheduling utility functions
for home and work are assumed to be linear: β (t) = β0−β1t and γ (t) = γ0+γ1t,
with β0, β1, γ0 and γ1 all strictly positive. Following Bo¨rjesson et al. (2012), this
will be called the “slope” model.
As demonstrated in the previous two sections, both the UE and SO are sensi-
tive to the shape of the incident risk function. A reasonable baseline assumption
is that incident risk is constant and this is assumed for the example: f (n) = f ,
where f is a constant. Appendix B.5 gives partial analytical solutions for the UE
and SO.
6.1 Calibration
Tseng and Verhoef (2008) derive non-parametric estimates of functions β (t) and
γ (t) for morning commuting trips by car or public transport. Their estimates
are approximated fairly well by the slope model. Linear regressions of β (t) and
γ (t) were therefore performed using the seven observations for their mixed-logit
estimates (see Table 3 of their paper). These produced estimates of β1 = 8.86
e/hr2 and γ1= 25.42 e/hr2. A complication with the estimates of β0 and γ0 is
that time spent traveling is preferred to time spent at work for working more than
about 10 min before t∗. Time spent traveling is also preferred to time spent at
home shortly before t∗. Such preferences would induce very high or infinite (i.e.,
mass) departures in UE (see Arnott et al., 1990). To avoid this, parameters β0 and
γ0 were set by trial and error to generate reasonable departure rates over the full
travel period. The values chosen were β0 = γ0 = 40; with β0 = γ0 this implies
t∗ = 0. The parameterized utility functions used are therefore β (t) = 40− 8.86t
and γ (t) = 40 + 25.42t.
There are relatively few studies of incident duration. For accidents that involve
one lane closure, Golob et al. (1987) find a mean incident duration of about one
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hour.26 Jones et al. (1991) obtain a similar mean of 55 min. Nam and Mannering
(2000) obtain a much higher mean of 162.5 min for incidents in an Incident Re-
sponse Team database that tend to be more severe than average. For the example
here, a smaller value of 30 min was selected for parameter ∆. This compensates
in a rough way for the assumption that incidents completely block the bottleneck
which is often not the case for multi-lane highways. It is in line with Hall (1993)
who assumes that durations are uniformly distributed between 5 and 60 min with
a mean of 32.5 min. It is also consistent with Koster and Rietveld (2011) who
assume that incidents last for 35 min and reduce capacity by 80 percent.
Parameters N and s were set to N = 8, 000 and s = 4, 000, and incident
risk was set to f = 0.2/N so that incident probability is fN = 0.2. This im-
plies that an incident occurs once per work week. On average, half the commuters
would pass the bottleneck before the incident occurred so that individual com-
muters would experience an incident-related delay on one day out of ten. The
results of the example are reported in the next subsection. The following subsec-
tion examines a modified version of the example that is descriptive of an evening
commute.
6.2 Results for the morning commute
In the example, departures are compressed in both the UE and SO.27 The two
solutions are compared in Table 1.
26For “rear-end and sideswipe collisions” the mean is 58 min, and for “hit-object, broadside,
and ‘other’ types of collisions” the mean is 62 min (Table 7 of their paper).
27Condition (5) for the UE is satisfied for fN < 0.4482, and Condition (18) for the SO is satis-
fied for fN < 0.4936. The UE and SO are therefore both compressed unless incident probability
is nearly 1/2.
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No incidents Incidents Effect of
fN = 0 fN = 0.2 incident risk
UE SO UE SO UE SO
1
First departure
time [hr] -1.00 -1.00 -1.101 -1.037 -0.101 -0.037
2
Last departure
time [hr] 1.00 1.00 0.899 0.936 -0.101 -0.037
3
Expected average
social trip cost [e] 17.14 5.71 20.78 8.43 3.64 2.72
4
Average social
trip cost on
Good days [e]
17.14 5.71 18.16 5.74 1.02 0.03
5
Average social
trip cost on
Bad days [e]
— — 31.23 19.21 — —
6 Row 5 - Row 4 13.07 13.47
Table 1: Comparison of user equilibrium and social optimum (morning)
The UE begins about 6 min earlier than with no incident risk. The initial de-
parture rate is 15,389 veh/hr: appreciably higher than the rate of 13,405 veh/hr
without incidents.28 Consistent with Theorem 2, the SO also begins earlier than
without incidents but the time shift is much smaller than for the UE. Expected trip
costs are measured by the loss of expected utility relative to an ideal in which bot-
tleneck capacity is effectively infinite, incidents never occur, and all drivers can
therefore travel from home to work simultaneously at t∗. Without incidents, the
cost of a trip is e17.14 in the UE and e5.71 in the SO. SO cost is only one third
as large as UE cost because, in the slope model, two thirds of trip costs in the UE
are due to queuing time which is avoided in the SO. With incidents, expected trip
cost increases by e3.64 to e20.78 in the UE, and by e2.72 to e8.43 in the SO.
The proportional increase in expected cost is larger for the SO, and in this respect
the SO is less effective than the UE at adapting to incidents. One reason is that de-
partures begin later in the SO than the UE, so that incident-related delays impose
a higher cost from late arrivals. Another is that the SO with compressed depar-
tures is designed to avoid queuing on Good days while maintaining full capacity
utilization. The SO has no “margin of reserve”, and it is therefore vulnerable to
capacity breakdowns.
The increase in expected cost can be decomposed into an increase on Good
days and an increase on Bad days. Row 4 of Table 1 shows that the cost in-
crease on Good days is negligible for the SO (e0.03) but appreciable for the UE
28Introduction of a small incident risk invariably leads to an increase in the initial departure rate
if β1 < 2γ1; see Appendix B.5.
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(e1.02). This is because the shift toward earlier departures is more pronounced
in the UE. On Bad days, expected trip costs are higher in the UE (e31.23) than
the SO (e19.21). But the difference in costs between Good days and Bad days
is actually slightly higher in the SO (e13.47) than the UE (e13.07). In the UE,
drivers adjust their departure times in response to incident risk in order to reduce
the costs of lateness on Bad days while sacrificing some utility on Good days. As
explained above, the SO is less flexible because the rate of departures is fixed, and
only the timing of the travel period is adjusted.
Figure 2 plots the total cost of an incident (measured relative to Good days)
as a function of when the incident occurs.29 The SO curve lies slightly above the
UE curve at all times. Both curves decline monotonically because later incidents
affect fewer drivers. However, both curves are concave because drivers who depart
later are more adversely affected by incidents so that even late incidents impose a
significant loss.
Figure 2: Total cost of incidents in user equilibrium and social optimum (morning)
29Since incidents occur as drivers pass the bottleneck, the probability density of incidents is
uniform with respect to timing.
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Figures 3 and 4 plot individual driver’s trip costs in UE and SO (including
toll) according to whether or not they encounter an incident. In each case the cost
with no incident decreases with departure time while the cost with an incident
increases. The increase in cost due to an incident grows from about e10 for the
first driver to e35 for the last driver. Departing later is therefore riskier, and
if drivers were risk-averse they would tend to depart in order of decreasing risk
aversion.30
Figure 3: Individual cost of incident in user equilibrium (morning)
One way to reduce the costs of incidents is to reduce their frequency. Another
is to reduce their duration. The effects of incident frequency and duration are
easily determined in the model by varying parameters f and ∆. Figure 5 shows
how incident probability affects expected costs per trip for the UE, the SO, and
the SO including toll costs. In all three cases the relationship is nearly linear. The
elasticities are respectively 1.009 for the UE, 0.9928 for the SO, and 0.9899 for the
SO including toll. In the case of the SO the elasticity cannot exceed one; it would
equal one if the departure schedule were held fixed independent of the incident
30de Palma et al. (2012) develop a model of route choice with drivers that differ in risk aversion,
and show how the most risk-averse drivers select the safer route.
30
Figure 4: Individual cost of incident in social optimum with toll (morning)
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probability, but this is generally not optimal. This reasoning does not apply to the
UE, and the elasticity is slightly above one. Thus, drivers’ uncoordinated response
to incident risks is collectively inefficient.
Figure 6 presents analogous results for incident duration. In each case, ex-
pected cost increases more than in proportion to duration. The elasticities are
1.109 for the UE, 1.111 for the SO, and 1.100 for the SO including toll. This
suggests that highest priority should be given to road links where major incidents
are common. The duration of incidents that require assistance is equal to the sum
of detection time, time required to dispatch emergency vehicles, travel time to the
incident location, and service time (Hall, 2002). Incident duration can be reduced
by expediting any of these stages. Carson et al. (1999) determine that even short
reductions in incident response and clearance times can yield high benefit-to-cost
ratios.
A notable feature of Figure 6 is how much the toll boosts the private costs of
incidents borne by drivers in the SO. Figure 7 displays the toll schedule for three
levels of incident duration as well as a case without incidents (effectively, inci-
dents of zero duration). As incident duration increases, the toll schedule increases
rapidly and it also advances slowly as departures begin earlier. With ∆ = 1.5
hr, the toll begins at e16.87 and rises to a maximum of e30.24 before declining
smoothly to zero. Such a high toll is attributable to the combined effects of inelas-
tic demand, relatively strong trip-timing preferences, and long-lasting incidents
that shut capacity down completely. In practice, tolls are likely to be lower than
this.
6.3 Results for the evening commute
To this point we have used the model to describe incidents that occur during the
morning commute. Yet the model can be applied to other situations in which
people wish to move from one location to another at the same time. An obvious
instance is the evening commute. The evening commute has not been studied as
extensively as the morning commute, either theoretically or empirically, but it is
generally considered that work time constraints are a major – if not dominating
– factor in determining when people leave work. In theoretical studies that have
used the step model to describe the evening commute it is typically assumed that
scheduling costs are determined by departure time (from work) rather than arrival
time (at home), and that the unit cost of departing from work early is greater than
the unit cost of departing late.31 In the slope model the corresponding assumption
is that β1 > γ1. This is what Bo¨rjesson et al. (2012) find using a stated preference
31See, for example, Fargier (1983), de Palma and Lindsey (2002), and Zhang et al. (2008).
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Figure 5: Effect of incident probability on incident costs (morning)
33
Figure 6: Effect of incident duration on incident costs (morning)
34
Figure 7: Effect of incident duration on socially optimal toll (morning)
35
data set for a sample of people traveling for a variety of purposes.32 In contrast to
Tseng and Verhoef (2008), their estimate of β1 is more than three times as large
as their estimate of γ1 (see their Table 6).
We now briefly investigate how incident risk affects commuting behaviour in
the evening commute, and compare it with the morning. To simplify the com-
parison, instead of adopting the Bo¨rjesson et al. (2012) estimates we simply in-
terchange the estimates of β1 and γ1, and use β1 = 25.42 e/hr2 and γ1 = 8.86
e/hr2.33 Other parameter values are kept the same as for the morning.
In the absence of incident risk, the evening commute is a mirror image of
the morning commute for both UE and SO in terms of the departure period and
trip costs. However, the initial departure rate is lower in the evening than the
morning. Substituting parameter values into the formula ρ (te00 ) =
2β0+β1N/s
2β0−γ1N/ss
one obtains an initial departure rate of 8,403 veh/hr for the evening compared to
13,405 veh/hr for the morning. Figure 1 offers an explanation for the difference.
The scheduling utility functions drawn there depict a morning commute with γ (·)
steeper than β (·) in the neighborhood of t∗ (in the slope model the two functions
are linear). For the evening commute, γ (·) is flatter than β (·). Area hlmj is
therefore taller than the area shown, and correspondingly narrower. Queuing time
therefore grows more slowly. The intuition for this is that utility from time spent
at home is relatively insensitive to time of day, and workers therefore have less
to gain by delaying departure from work. Another difference from the morning is
that introduction of a small incident risk leads to a reduction in the initial departure
rate.34
Table 2 displays other properties of the evening commute corresponding to
those for the morning commute shown in Table 1. Departures are again com-
pressed in both the UE and SO.35 Compared to the morning, departures in the UE
and SO begin later. The UE begins about 4 min earlier than without incident risk
compared to 6 min earlier for the morning. Incident risk has a smaller effect be-
cause, with a smaller value of γ1, arriving late is less costly. For the same reason,
average trip costs for UE and SO are lower on both Good days and Bad days than
in the morning.
32Rather surprisingly, they find no significant differences in scheduling parameters for either
morning and afternoon trips, or for different trip purposes.
33 The ratio β1/γ1 = 2.86 is similar to the ratio of 3.26 that Bo¨rjesson et al. (2012) obtain.
34This happens if 2β0 (2γ1 − β1) + β1γ1
(
N
s −∆
)
< 0, which is satisfied in the example; see
Appendix B.5.
35Condition (5) for the UE is satisfied for fN < 0.5778, and Condition (18) for the SO is
satisfied for fN < 0.6763.
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No incidents Incidents Effect of
fN = 0 fN = 0.2 incident risk
UE SO UE SO UE SO
1
First departure
time [hr] -1.00 -1.00 -1.074 -1.013 -0.074 -0.013
2
Last departure
time [hr] 1.00 1.00 0.936 0.987 -0.074 -0.013
3
Expected average
social trip cost [e] 17.14 5.71 19.75 7.97 2.61 2.26
4
Average social
trip cost on
Good days [e]
17.14 5.71 17.53 5.72 0.41 0.01
5
Average social
trip cost on
Bad days [e]
— — 28.66 16.98 — —
6 Row 5 - Row 4 11.13 11.26
Table 2: Comparison of user equilibrium and social optimum (evening)
For the UE, expected trip cost increases by only e2.61 compare to e3.64 for
the morning. For the SO, expected trip costs increases by e2.26 compared to
e2.72 for the morning. Again, the proportional increase in expected cost is much
larger for the SO than the UE for reasons similar to those for the morning.
Figure 8 plots the total cost of an incident as a function of when the incident
occurs. Unlike for the morning shown in Figure 2, the SO curve crosses the UE
curve twice rather than lying wholly above it. Both curves are still concave, but
less so than for the morning because late incidents are not as costly when the
penalty for arriving late at home is less severe.
Figures 9 and 10 plot individual driver’s trip costs in UE and SO according to
whether or not they encounter an incident. The two sets of curves are much flatter
than in Figures 3 and 4 for the morning. For both UE and SO, the cost incurred
when encountering an incident grows from about e16 for the first driver to e25
for the last driver. Departing later is therefore riskier, but much less so than for
the morning commute.
7 Incidents with partial reductions in bottleneck ca-
pacity
Most incidents on multi-lane highways do not reduce capacity to zero.36 Suppose
an incident reduces bottleneck capacity from s to k ∈ [0, s). Call an incident
36See Highway Capacity Manual 2000 (2000, Chapter 22, Table 22-6).
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Figure 8: Total cost of incidents in user equilibrium and social optimum (evening)
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Figure 9: Individual cost of incident in user equilibrium (evening)
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Figure 10: Individual cost of incident in social optimum with toll (evening)
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“major” if k = 0 (as in the basic model), and “minor” if k > 0. Minor incidents
are more complicated to analyze than major incidents, and some properties of
major incidents do not extend to minor incidents. Consequently, the analysis of
minor incidents here is brief.
7.1 User equilibrium
Lemmas 1 and 2 describing UE for major incidents also apply to minor inci-
dents.37 However, the delay due to a minor incident depends on when it occurs
and it is necessary to consider the amount of time elapsed between an incident
and when a driver departs. Figure 11 depicts the various possibilities. A driver
departing in the interval t ∈ [t0, R−1 (k∆)] encounters one of two cases: (1) no
incident has yet occurred, or (2) an incident has occurred that ends after the driver
arrives at work. A driver departing in the interval t ∈ [R−1 (k∆) , t0 + ∆] can
encounter a third case: (3) an incident has occurred that ends before the driver ar-
rives at work. Finally, a driver departing after t0 + ∆ can encounter a fourth case:
(4) an incident has ended before the driver departs. Case 2 can temporarily “dis-
appear” either before or after t0 + ∆. (Figure 11 shows an example in which Case
2 disappears after t0 + ∆.) However, Case 2 necessarily “reappears” before the
last driver departs at tN . The delay due to an incident differs between the cases;
formulas are derived in Appendix B.6.
The first departure in UE is determined (see Appendix B.6) by the condition∫ teN
v=te0
(β (v)− γ (v)) dv = F
(
Re
(
teN −
k
s
∆
))∫ teN+ s−ks ∆
v=teN
γ (v) dv(50)
+
∫ teN
v=teN− ks∆
f (Re (v)) ρe (v)
∫ teN+ s−ks (teN−v)
t=teN
γ (t) dtdv.
If k = 0, eqn. (50) simplifies to eqn. (8) for major incidents. Equation (50) in-
volves lagged values of the departure rate, ρe (v), for v ∈ [teN − ks∆, teN], and has
to be solved numerically. The initial departure rate turns out to be as in eqn. (2):
the same formula as without incidents. Since te0 < t
e0
0 , ρ
e (te0) > ρ
e0 (te00 ). Thus,
unlike for major incidents, the risk of minor incidents unambiguously raises the
initial departure rate. This is because minor incidents do not eliminate capacity,
and thus impose only a short delay on early drivers. The risk taken by postpon-
ing departure is therefore smaller, and the queue required to deter drivers from all
departing later is correspondingly longer.
37The proof of Lemma 2 for major incidents is slightly modified; see Appendix B.6.
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Figure 11: Timing of minor incidents (morning)
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7.2 The social optimum
Lemma 3 for major incidents carries over to minor incidents and the proof is the
same. However, the SO for minor incidents is tedious to derive since the SO
departure rate depends on both lagged and leading values of itself. Attention
is limited here to compressed departures. The SO departure period is derived in
Appendix B.6 where it is shown that ∂tw0 /∂k > 0. The SO therefore begins earlier
when incidents are more severe (i.e., k is smaller). We have been unable to rank
tw0 and t
e
0.
The UE and SO with compressed departures can be derived for the example
in Section 6. Figure 12 plots for UE and SO of the morning commute the increase
in expected trip cost due to incidents as the fraction of capacity lost in an incident
(i.e., 1 − k/s) increases from 0 to 1. The two curves rise smoothly, and at k = 0
they reach the values of e3.64 and e2.72 that apply for major incidents. Both
curves are convex so that the expected cost of an incident is more than proportional
to the capacity lost. This is broadly consistent with the finding in Section 6 that
the cost of incidents is more than proportional to their duration.
Figure 12: Increase in expected trip cost from minor incidents (morning)
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8 Concluding remarks
Incidents are a major cause of traffic congestion in large urban areas. This paper
uses the bottleneck model to analyze the effects of incidents on trip-timing de-
cisions and trip costs. Incidents are assumed to be caused by individual drivers
while they travel. Unlike in previous studies except for Schrage (2006), the tim-
ing of incidents is endogenous to traveler behavior. This enriches the realism and
lessons derived from the model, but also adds complexity.
Several general results deserve highlighting. First, three biases are identified
in the timing of departures in the UE relative to the SO. One is the familiar bias
toward departing too quickly in the early stages of the travel period which leads to
queuing on Good days in the UE, but not in the SO. The other two biases are driven
by incident risk and they act in opposite directions. Drivers are biased toward de-
parting too early because they do not want to be delayed by an incident and arrive
seriously late. But they are also biased toward departing too late because they
ignore the delays they will impose on subsequent drivers if they cause an incident.
This last bias is missing from models in which incidents occur exogenously.
Second, if the probability of an incident is sufficiently high, then in both the
UE and the SO bottleneck capacity is not fully used for the entire travel period
on Good days when no incident occurs, and the departure pattern is “dispersed”.
For the SO this can be interpreted as a policy of maintaining reserve capacity in
order to moderate the adverse effects of incidents on Bad days. A third result is
that if departures are compressed in the SO, then drivers are worse off than in
the UE if the SO is decentralized using a non-negative time-varying toll. This
might aggravate resistance to congestion pricing and correspondingly strengthen
arguments for using toll revenues in a way that benefits drivers.
Further lessons concerning how the probability, duration, and magnitude of
incidents affect expected travel costs can be drawn from numerical examples. For
the parameterized slope-model example we use, incidents that occur early in the
travel period are more costly than later incidents because early incidents affect
more travellers. The expected costs of incidents in both the UE and SO are ap-
proximately linear in the probability of incidents, but convex in their magnitude
and duration. This suggests that, not surprisingly, priority for incident manage-
ment should be given to shortening major and long-lived types of incidents.
There are many ways in which the paper could be extended. The analysis
could be refined by relaxing the persistent-queue assumption. Heterogeneity in
drivers’ scheduling preferences could be introduced. The duration of incidents
could be treated as a random variable. More than one incident per day could
be allowed. The assumption that multiple incidents never occur is reasonable
if incidents are rare. For the base case of the numerical example it is assumed
that the probability of no incident is 0.8. Given the underlying hazard rate, more
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than one incident would occur with probability 0.0215, or about once every 45
days. Moreover, if a second incident occurs while the first is ongoing, the second
incident has no effect until the first is cleared up. In the case of minor incidents,
the effect of two concurrent incidents may be approximately equal to the impact
of the one that is more severe (Hall, 2002).
Another extension is to treat travel demand as price sensitive. The number of
trips taken would then differ for the user equilibrium and social optimum. It would
also depend on the frequency, severity, and duration of incidents. By reducing
the expected costs of travel, incident management schemes would stimulate more
trips, and correspondingly more incidents, that would partially offset the policy
benefits (Hall, 1993; Koster and Rietveld, 2011).
Another interesting extension is to assume that individuals are risk averse.
Bo¨rjesson et al. (2012) find that scheduling models severely underestimate the
disutility that individuals incur from travel time variability.38 They offer two plau-
sible explanations for this. One is that, contrary to what is assumed in scheduling
models, people do not have a fixed preferred arrival time (t∗ in the model here) be-
cause they can reschedule many activities given advance information about travel
time durations. The other explanation is that people may dislike uncertainty itself
because of the anxiety it creates, the costs incurred when decided when to depart,
or the costs of formulating contingency plans. As Bo¨rjesson et al. (2012) put it,
being ‘delayed’ can be worse than just being ‘late’. Risk aversion could be intro-
duced into the model in a crude way by adding to the expected utility function a
term proportional to the standard deviation of travel time.
Incident risk could be assumed to depend on time of day or other circum-
stances. For instance, incident risk is higher at night (Varghese and Shankar,
2007) and in rain (FHWA Road Weather Management Program, 2009). A more
radical step would be to reformulate the model using a flow congestion model
as in Schrage (2006). One reason for doing so is that queuing congestion mili-
tates against maintaining spare capacity since it does not offer a smooth trade-off
between higher capacity utilization on Good days and extra delay on Bad days.
Such a trade-off does exist with flow congestion. Another reason is that both the
frequency and severity of incidents per vehicle-km driven could depend on speed
and/or the density of vehicles on the road (Shefer and Rietveld, 1997). The empir-
ical evidence on this is limited and inconsistent.39 A few studies have found that
severe accidents are more common in light traffic. However, Wang et al. (2009)
conclude that traffic congestion has no statistically significant effect on accident
frequency on the M25 London orbital motorway. To the extent that incident rates
38This finding shows up in both the step model and the slope model they estimate.
39See, for example, Dickerson et al. (2000), Noland and Quddus (2005), and Small and Verhoef
(2007, Section 3.4.6).
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do vary with traffic conditions, the introduction of congestion tolls will affect not
only congestion externalities but also incident/accident externalities (Dickerson
et al., 2000).
A final extension worth noting is information about incidents. We have as-
sumed that drivers know the risk function for incidents, f (·), but not whether an
incident has occurred. It is true that pre-trip and en-route information about travel
conditions are now available from various media. Nevertheless, incidents often
occur after people have made their travel decisions and can alter them only with
difficulty — if at all. Changes of route may be possible in urban areas with dense
road networks, but drivers may be reluctant to switch route if alternatives are either
circuitous or unfamiliar. For example, the shortest route from metro Vancouver to
the US border is via the George Massey Tunnel on Highway 99. Long delays are
frequently encountered at the tunnel. The closest alternative crossing is via the
Alex Fraser Bridge on Highway 91 which is about 10 kilometres to the east. In
settings such as these, travellers have little alternative to queuing once they are en
route.
In other settings where travelers can respond to information, the effectiveness
of the response will depend on a number of factors including the timeliness and
precision of information, the fraction of travelers who have access to it, the pro-
portion of them who choose to respond and how, whether alternative routes are
congested, and so on. These and other design considerations for Advanced Trav-
eler Information Systems have been extensively studied since the late 1980s.40
The effects of information provision in an extended version of the current model
are not easy to envisage.
40For reviews see Rietveld (2011) and Chorus and Timmermans (2011).
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A Notational Glossary
A.1 Latin characters
a : arrival time at work [clock time]
e: superscript denoting user equilibrium
E (): expectations operator
f : probability density of an incident (“incident risk”)
F : cumulative probability of an incident (“incident probability”)
h: headway between successive departures [hr]
H: subscript denoting home
k : bottleneck capacity during incident (k = 0 for major incidents) [veh./hr]
n : index of drivers in order of departure
nˆ : value of n at which socially optimal departure rate drops below capacity
N : number of drivers
q (t): queuing time [hr]
q+ (n): queuing time in social optimum if no incident has occurred [hr]
qξ (n): queuing time in social optimum if driver ξ causes an incident [hr]
R : cumulative departures [veh]
s : bottleneck capacity with no incident [veh./hr]
t : departure time from home [clock time]
t0 : time when first driver departs from home [clock time]
tH : time at which utility accounting begins (at home) [clock time]
tN : time when last driver departs from home [clock time]
tW : time at which utility accounting ends (at work) [clock time]
t∗ : preferred time to transfer instantaneously from home to work [clock time]
T : set of departure times
u : scheduling utility
U : aggregate utility
v: clock time (used as variable for integration)
w: superscript denoting social optimum
W : subscript denoting work
A.2 Greek characters
β: rate of utility derived from time spent at home
β0, β1: parameters of linear β () function
γ: rate of utility derived from time spent at work
γ0, γ1: parameters of linear γ () function
∆: duration of incident [hr]
λ+ (n): costate variable for q+ (n)
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λξ (n): costate variable for qξ (n)
µ1: costate variable for departure time in Stage 1 of social optimum
µ2: costate variable for departure time in Stage 2 of social optimum
ξ: index of driver who causes an incident
ρ: aggregate departure rate from origin [veh./hr]
τ : toll [e]
Ψ: multiplier on nonnegativity constraint q+ (n) ≥ 0
Ω: Hamiltonian for social optimum
A.3 Other characters
0: superscript denoting model without incidents.
B Mathematical appendixes
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Part (a): Suppose ρw (t) > s on some interval. Then Rw (t) intersects a fam-
ily of lines s
(
t− tˆ) parameterized by tˆ. For any such tˆ, a queue exists for all
t ∈ Tˆ ≡ {t : Rw (t) > s (t− tˆ)} . Reducing Rw (·) to s (t− tˆ) on Tˆ postpones
departures from home for a cohort of drivers without delaying their arrivals at
work. The cohort’s utility increases strictly without affecting the utility of other
drivers. Hence ρw (t) ≤ s on Tw.
Part (b), proof that tw0 < t
∗: Following the approach of Section 5.2, write total
expected utility as:
E (U) =
∫ N
n=0
[
(1− F (n))U (t (n) , t (n))
+
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ)U (t (n) , t (n) + qξ (n)) dξ
]
dn,
where t (n) is the departure time of driver n, and qξ (n) is queuing time for driver
n if driver ξ < n causes an incident. Consider slightly advancing the departure
times of all drivers by dt > 0. Total expected utility changes by
dE (U) = dt
∫ N
n=0
[
(1− F (n)) (γ (t (n))− β (t (n)))
+
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ) (γ (t (n) + qξ (n))− β (t (n))) dξ
]
dn
= dt
∫ N
n=0
[ −β (t (n)) + (1− F (n)) γ (t (n))
+
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ) γ (t (n) + qξ (n)) dξ
]
dn.
If tw0 ≥ t∗, then β (t (n)) ≤ γ (t (n)) ≤ γ (t (n) + qξ (n)), ∀n, with β (t (n)) <
γ (t (n)) for n > 0. Hence dE (U) > 0, and tw0 ≥ t∗ cannot be optimal.
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Part (b), proof that twN > t
∗: Suppose twN ≤ t∗, and let the last driver depart dt
later. The last driver’s expected utility changes by dE (u| twN) = (β (twN)− (1− F (N)) γ (twN)) dt.
Given β (twN) ≥ γ (twN) and F (N) > 0, dE (u| twN) > 0, and twN ≤ t∗ cannot be
optimal. 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Part (a): The right-hand side of (34) can be bounded above and below:
0 < F (N)
∫ twN+∆
t=twN
γ (t) dt− s
∫ twN
t=tw0
f (s (t− tw0 ))
(∫ t+∆
v=t
γ (v) dv
)
dt
< F (N)
∫ twN+∆
t=twN
γ (t) dt.
Comparison with equation (8) for te0 shows that t
w
0 ∈ (te0, te00 ).
Part (b): If a toll implements the SO, expected utility net of the toll must be
constant over the departure interval Tw and lower outside Tw. Such a toll has the
form τw (t) = E (u|t)+c = ∫ t
v=tH
β (v) dv+
∫ tW
v=t
γ (v) dv−F (n) ∫ t+∆
v=t
γ (v) dv+c
where c is a constant.
Part (c): Expected utility when departing in the UE at teN is given by (11):
E (u|teN) =
∫ teN
v=tH
β (v) dv+(1− F (N)) ∫ tW
v=teN
γ (v) dv+F (N)
∫ tW
v=teN+∆
γ (v) dv.
The same equation applies for E (u|twN) in the SO since, as in the UE, there is
no queue on Good days, and the delay due to an incident does not depend on
when it occurs. Therefore E (u|twN) − E (u|teN) =
∫ twN
v=teN
(β (v)− γ (v)) dv +
F (N)
(∫ twN
v=teN
γ (v) dv − ∫ twN+∆
v=teN+∆
γ (v) dv
)
. The first term in this expression is
negative since twN > t
e
N > t
∗. The second expression is also negative since
twN > t
e
N , ∆ > 0, and γ (·) is an increasing function. Expected utility gross of
the toll is therefore lower in the SO than the UE. If the toll cannot be negative,
drivers are therefore worse off in the SO if toll revenues are not used in a way that
benefits them.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Part (a): If UE departures are dispersed, then β (teN) = (1− F (N)) γ (teN) and
te0 < t
e
N−N/s. If SO departures are compressed, then β (twN) < (1− F (N)) γ (twN)
and tw0 = t
w
N −N/s. Therefore, tw0 = twN −N/s > teN −N/s > te0. The proof that
tw0 < t
w0
0 is the same as for Theorem 2.
Part (b): The proof that the SO can be implemented using a time-dependent
toll is the same as for Theorem 2.
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Part (c): The proof is similar to the proof for Theorem 2. Expected utility
when departing in the UE at teN is given by (14):
E (ue|teN) = (1− F (N))u (teN , teN)
+F
(
Re
(
t˜
))
u
(
teN , t
e
0 +
N
s
+ ∆
)
+
∫ teN
v=t˜
ρ (v) f (Re (v))u
(
teN , v + ∆ +
N −Re (v)
s
)
dv.(51)
where a superscript e has been added to u since formulas for expected utility differ
for the UE and SO. Integrating the last term of (51) by parts, and rearranging
terms, one obtains
E (ue|teN) = u (teN , teN)− F (N)
∫ teN+∆
v=teN
γ (v) dv
+
∫ teN
v=t˜
F (Re (v))
(
1− ρ
e (v)
s
)
γ
(
v + ∆ +
N −Re (v)
s
)
dv.(52)
Expected utility when departing in the SO at twN is
(53) E (uw|twN) = u (twN , twN)− F (N)
∫ twN+∆
v=twN
γ (v) dv.
Subtracting (52) from (53):
E (uw|twN)− E (ue|teN) =
∫ twN
v=teN
(β (v)− γ (v)) dv
+F (N)
(∫ twN
v=teN
γ (v) dv −
∫ twN+∆
v=teN+∆
γ (v) dv
)
−
∫ teN
v=t˜
F (Re (v))
(
1− ρ
e (v)
s
)
γ
(
v + ∆ +
N −Re (v)
s
)
dv.
The first two terms in this expression are negative (see proof of Theorem 2).
The third term is also negative since ρe (v) < s for v ∈ [t˜, teN]. Expected utility
net of the toll is therefore lower in the SO than UE. If the toll cannot be negative,
and drivers do not benefit from toll revenues, drivers are worse off.
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B.4 Optimal headway in Stage 2
Differentiating (44) totally with respect to n one obtains:
β´ (t (n))h (n) = (1− F (n)) γ´ (t (n))h (n)
−f (n) γ (t (n))− f (n) ∂λn (n)
∂n
− λn (n) ∂f (n)
∂n
.(54)
Now
∂λn (n)
∂n
=
∂λξ (n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
ξ=n
+
∂λξ (n)
∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
ξ=n
.
Given (43),
(55)
∂λξ (n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
ξ=n
= γ (t (n) + ∆) ,
and
∂λξ (n)
∂ξ
= −
∫ N
v=n
γ´
(
t (ξ) + ∆ + s−1 (v − ξ)) dv(h (ξ)− 1
s
)
,
so that
∂λξ (n)
∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
ξ=n
= −
∫ N
v=n
γ´
(
t (n) + ∆ + s−1 (v − n)) dv(h (n)− 1
s
)
(56)
=
(
1
s
− h (n)
)∫ N
v=n
γ´
(
t (n) + ∆ + s−1 (v − n)) dv.
Adding (55) and (56) yields
∂λn (n)
∂n
= γ (t (n) + ∆)(57)
+
(
1
s
− h (n)
)∫ N
v=n
γ´
(
t (n) + ∆ + s−1 (v − n)) dv.
Substituting (57) into (54), and rearranging terms, yields equation (47) in the text
for the optimal headway.
56
B.5 Analytical solution for linear example
B.5.1 User equilibrium
Given (8), the first departure in UE is at time
te0 =
β0 − γ0 − (β1 + γ1) N2s − fs∆
(
γ0 + γ1
(
N
s
+ ∆
2
))
β1 + γ1 + fγ1∆s
.
From (9), cumulative arrivals,Re (t), are given by the positive root of the quadratic
equation
γ1
2s
(1 + 2fs∆) (Re (t))2 +
(
(1 + fs∆) (γ0 + γ1t
e
0) +
fsγ1
2
∆2
)
Re (t)
−β0s (t− te0) +
β1s
2
(
t2 − (te0)2
)
= 0.
Assuming without loss of generality that β0 = γ0, it can be shown that
Sgn
(
∂ρ (te0)
∂f
∣∣∣∣
f=0
)
= 2β0 (2γ1 − β1) + β1γ1
(
N
s
−∆
)
.
A small incident risk leads to an increase in the initial departure rate unless pa-
rameter γ1 is small compared to β1.
B.5.2 Social optimum
Stage 1 If the SO is compressed, eqn. (34) applies and the first departure occurs
at time
tw0 =
β0 − γ0
β1 + γ1
− N
2s
− γ1
β1 + γ1
fN∆
2
.
It is easy to check that tw0 > t
e
0 if f > 0. Condition (18) is satisfied for the
candidate compressed SO if the following quadratic equation in Z ≡ fNγ1 is
negative:
(58)
−∆Z2 +
(
2
(
β0 +
β1γ0
γ1
)
+ (β1 + γ1)
(
N
s
+ ∆
))
Z − (β1 + γ1)2 N
s
< 0.
Condition (58) is clearly satisfied for small values of f .
The costate variable for departure time during Stage 1 is a negative, convex,
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and quadratic function of n:
µ1 (n) = (γ0 − β0 + (β1 + γ1) tw0 )n+
(
f∆γ1 +
β1 + γ1
s
)
n2
2
, n ∈ [0, nˆ] .
Stage 2 Departure time in Stage 2 is given by eqn. (44) which has an analytical
solution:
t2 (n) =
β0 − γ0 − fγ0 (N − 2n)− fγ1
(
∆ + N−n
2s
)
(N − n)
β1 + γ1 + fγ1 (N − 2n) , n ∈ [nˆ, N ] .
The last driver departs at
twN = t2 (N) =
β0 − γ0 (1− fN)
β1 + γ1 (1− fN) .
If the SO entails only Stage 2, nˆ = 0 and the first driver departs at
tw0 = t2 (0) =
β0 − γ0 − fN
(
γ0 + γ1
(
∆ + N
2s
))
β1 + γ1 (1 + fN)
.
The costate variable for departure time in stage 2, µ2 (n), is solved numerically
by integrating (41) backwards with respect to n from n = N .
B.6 Minor incidents
B.6.1 User equilibrium: Proof of Lemma 2 for minor incidents
A driver who deviates from a candidate compressed UE and departs at t ∈ (teN , teN + s−ks ∆)
has an expected utility
E (u|t) = (1− F (N))u (t, t) +
tN∫
v=tN− ks∆
f (R (v)) ρ (v)u
(
t,
s
k
tN − s− k
k
v
)
dv
+F
(
R
(
tN − k
s
∆
))
u
(
t, tN +
s− k
s
∆
)
.
The derivative of expected utility is
∂E (u|t)
∂t
= β (t)− (1− F (N)) γ (t) ,
which is the same as for major incidents. Hence condition (5) still applies. 
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B.6.2 Timing of departures in user equilibrium
As noted in the text, the delay imposed by an incident on a driver depends on
when it occurs. Four cases are possible.
Case 1: No incident has occurred A driver departing at t arrives at a = t0 +
R (t) /s. The contribution to the driver’s expected utility is:
(59) ∆ue1 = (1− F (R (t)))u (t, t0 +R (t) /s) .
Case 2: An incident has occurred that persists throughout the driver’s trip
If the incident occurs at time v, a driver departing at t arrives when the number of
drivers who have passed the bottleneck catches up with cumulative departures at
t: s (v − t0) + k (a− v) = R (t). Hence a = R(t)+st0k − s−kk v. Since the driver
must arrive before the incident ends, a ≤ v + ∆. This condition translates to
v ≥ t0 + R(t)−k∆s . The incident must also occur before the driver departs: v ≤ t.
Accounting for these conditions, the contribution to the driver’s expected utility
is:
(60)
∆ue2 =
t∫
v=Max[t0,t0+R(t)−k∆s ]
f (R (v)) ρ (v)u
(
t,
R (t) + st0
k
− s− k
k
v
)
dv.
Case 3: An incident has occurred that ends before the driver arrives Arrival
time is determined by the condition s (v − t0)+k∆+s (a− v −∆) = R (t) which
yields a = t0 + s−kk ∆ +
R(t)
s
. The incident cannot end before the driver departs:
v > t − ∆. But it must end before the driver arrives: v ≤ t0 + R(t)−k∆s . The
contribution to the driver’s expected utility is:
∆ue3 =
Min[t,t0+R(t)−k∆s ]∫
v=Max[t0,t−∆]
f (R (v)) ρ (v)u
(
t, t0 +
s− k
k
∆ +
R (t)
s
)
dv
=
(
F
(
R
(
Min
[
t, t0 +
R (t)− k∆
s
]))
− F (R (Max [t0, t−∆]))
)
u
(
t, t0 +
s− k
k
∆ +
R (t)
s
)
.(61)
Case 4: An incident has ended before the driver departs Arrival time is de-
termined by the same condition as for Case 3 so that a = t0 + s−kk ∆ +
R(t)
s
. The
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incident must end before the driver departs: v < t − ∆. The contribution to the
driver’s expected utility is:
(62) ∆ue4 = F (R (Max [t0, t−∆]))u
(
t, t0 +
s− k
s
∆ +
R (t)
s
)
.
For the last driver who departs at tN , Cases 1-4 are all applicable. Using eqns.
(59)-(62) and R (tN) = N , the last driver’s expected utility is
E (u|tN) = (1− F (N))u (tN , tN) +
tN∫
v=tN− ks∆
f (R (v)) ρ (v)u
(
tN ,
s
k
tN − s− k
k
v
)
dv
+F
(
R
(
tN − k
s
∆
))
u
(
tN , tN +
s− k
s
∆
)
.
Equilibrium departure period The timing of the departure period [te0, teN ] is
determined by the condition teN = t
e
0 + N/s and the condition that E (u|tN) =
u (t0, t0). Using eqn. (1), the latter condition works out to eqn. (50) in the text:∫ teN
v=te0
(β (v)− γ (v)) dv = F
(
Re
(
teN −
k
s
∆
))∫ teN+ s−ks ∆
v=teN
γ (v) dv(63)
+
∫ teN
v=teN− ks∆
f (Re (v)) ρe (v)
∫ teN+ s−kk (teN−v)
t=teN
γ (t) dtdv.
Equation (63) can be solved numerically using the following iterative proce-
dure:
1. Guess te0 and set t = t
e
0.
2. Increment departure time by a small time step dt from t to t+ dt.
3. Determine which of Cases 1-4 are applicable. Set the derivative of E (u|t)
to zero, and solve for ρe (t).
4. Update Re (t+ dt) = Re (t) + ρe (t) dt.
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until t = te0 +N/s.
6. Evaluate condition (63) using the values computed for ρe (t), t ∈ [teN − ks∆, teN].
If condition (63) is satisfied to within a tolerance limit, then stop. Otherwise
return to step 1.
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Initial departure rate For the first few drivers, only Cases 1 and 2 apply. Using
eqns. (59) and (60), expected utility is
(1− F (R (t)))u (t, t0 +R (t) /s)
+
t∫
v=t0
f (R (v)) ρ (v)u
(
t,
R (t) + st0
k
− s− k
k
v
)
dv.
Differentiating this expression with respect to t, and evaluating it at t = t0, one
obtains
ρe (te0)
s
=
β (te0)
γ (te0)
.
This is the same as eqn. (2) with t = te00 for the model without incidents. Since
te0 < t
e0
0 , ρ
e (te0) > ρ
e0 (te00 ).
B.6.3 Social optimum
Expected utility of drivers for the SO is derived in a similar way to UE, but using
the formula that cumulative departures equal R (t) = s (t− t0).
Case 1: No incident has occurred A driver departing at t arrives at t. The
contribution to the driver’s expected utility is:
(64) ∆uw1 = (1− F (s (t− t0)))u (t, t) .
Case 2: An incident has occurred that persists throughout the driver’s trip
If the incident occurs at time v, a driver departing at t arrives when the number
of drivers who have passed through the bottleneck catches up with cumulative
departures at t: s (v − t0) + k (a− v) = s (t− t0). The driver therefore arrives at
a = s
k
t− s−k
k
v. Since the driver must arrive before the incident ends, a ≤ v + ∆,
which translates to v ≥ t − k
s
∆. The incident must also occur before the driver
departs: v ≤ t − ∆. Accounting for these conditions, the contribution to the
driver’s expected utility is:
(65) ∆uw2 =
t∫
v=Max[t0,t− ks∆]
f (s (v − t0)) su
(
t,
s
k
t− s− k
k
v
)
dv.
Case 3: An incident has occurred that ends before the driver arrives Arrival
time is determined by the condition s (v − t0) + k∆ + (s− v −∆) = s (t− t0)
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which yields a = t + s−k
s
∆. Since the driver must arrive after the incident ends,
v ≤ t− k
s
∆. The contribution to the driver’s expected utility is:
∆uw3 =
t− k
s
∆∫
v=Max[t0,t−∆]
f (s (v − t0)) su
(
t, t+
s− k
s
∆
)
dv,
which can be broken out into three intervals:
(66)
∆uw3 =

0 if t < t0 + ks∆
F (s (t− t0)− k∆)u
(
t, t+ s−k
s
∆
)
if t ∈ (t0 + ks∆, t0 + ∆)
(F (s (t− t0)− k∆)− F (s (t−∆− t0)))
u
(
t, t+ s−k
s
∆
)
if t > t0 + ∆.
Case 4: An incident has ended before the driver departs Arrival time is deter-
mined by the same condition as for Case 3 so that a = t+ s−k
s
∆. The contribution
to expected utility is:
(67) ∆uw4 = F (s (t−∆− t0))u
(
t, t+
s− k
s
∆
)
.
Summing terms in (64)-(67) one obtains
E (u|t) =

(1− F (s (t− t0)))u (t, t)
+s
t∫
v=t0
f (s (v − t0))u
(
t, s
k
t− s−k
k
v
)
dv if t < t0 + ks∆
(1− F (s (t− t0)))u (t, t) + F (s (t− t0)− k∆)u
(
t, t+ s−k
s
∆
)
+s
t∫
v=t− k
s
∆
f (s (v − t0))u
(
t, s
k
t− s−k
k
v
)
dv if t > t0 + ks∆
.
Changing the variable of integration from t to n, total expected utility becomes:
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E (U) =
∫ k∆
n=0
 (1− F (n)) ∫ t0+n/sv=tH β (v) dv + ∫ tWv=t0+n/s γ (v) dv
+
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ)
(∫ t0+n/s
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=t0+
n
k
− s−k
sk
ξ
γ (v) dv
)
dv
 dn
(68)
+
∫ N
n=k∆

(1− F (n)) ∫ t0+n/s
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=t0+n/s
γ (v) dv
+F (n− k∆)
(∫ t0+n/s
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=t0+
n
s
+(s−k)∆ γ (v) dv
)
dv
+
∫ n
ξ=n−k∆ f (ξ)
(∫ t0+n/s
v=tH
β (v) dv +
∫ tW
v=t0+
n
k
− s−k
sk
ξ
γ (v) dv
)
 dn.
Differentiating (68) with respect to t0, and collecting terms, the equation defining
the optimal tw0 can be written∫ N
n=0
(β (t (n))− γ (t (n))) dn+
∫ N
n=0
F (n) γ (t (n)) dn(69)
−
∫ N
n=k∆
F (n− k∆) γ (t∆ (n)) dn
−
∫ k∆
n=0
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ) γ (tξ (n)) dξdn−
∫ N
n=k∆
∫ n
ξ=n−k∆
f (ξ) γ (tξ (n)) dξdn = 0,
where t (n) = tw0 + n/s, t∆ (n) = t
w
0 + n/s +
s−k
s
∆, and tξ (n) = tw0 + n/s +
s−k
sk
(n− ξ). Condition (69) has the form∫ N
n=0
(β (t (n))− γ (t (n))) dn+ Z = 0.
Now
∂Z
∂k
=
∆
s
∫ N
n=k∆
F (n− k∆) γ´ (t∆ (n))(70)
+k−2
∫ k∆
n=0
∫ n
ξ=0
f (ξ) γ´ (tξ (n)) (n− ξ) dξdn
+k−2
∫ N
n=k∆
∫ n
ξ=n−k∆
f (ξ) γ´ (tξ (n)) (n− ξ) dξdn.
All components of (70) are strictly positive. Given (69) and t (n) = tw0 +n/s, this
implies that ∂tw0 /∂k > 0.
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